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Abstract
The adoption of court fees has been traditionally justifi ed as a means to improve the 
performance of enforcement institutions as they may have an effect of deterrence of 
the dispute. Judicial congestion has clear negative impacts on economic performance. 
Spain, which has one of the highest rates of litigation of the OECD, has traditionally 
lacked a general system of court fees. In 2002, the Congress passed a system of court 
fees to be paid by legal entities and enterprises. In 2012, the fees were extended to 
individuals and abrogated in 2015. This bounded period of enforcement allows us to 
empirically test the impacts of court fees on congestion. In order to do this, we collected a 
comprehensive database of quarterly data on the real workload of civil courts. This study 
concludes that the effects of court fees, although reduced courts’ congestion, are far from 
homogeneous and depend on the type of procedure, the workload of the courts and the 
local macroeconomic conditions.
Keywords: Courts fees, judicial effi cacy, litigation rates.
JEL classifi cation: K41, E51, G2.
Resumen
La aprobación de un sistema de tasas judiciales se ha justifi cado tradicionalmente como un 
medio para mejorar la efi cacia judicial, en tanto que podría reducir el número de confl ictos 
que se llevan ante la justicia. La congestión judicial, de hecho, está relacionada con un peor 
rendimiento de la economía. Si bien España tiene una de las tasas de litigación más altas de 
la OCDE, tradicionalmente ha carecido de un sistema amplio de tasas judiciales. En 2002, el
Congreso aprobó un sistema de tasas pagaderas por las personas jurídicas. En 2012, las 
tasas se ampliaron a las personas físicas y, en 2015, fueron derogadas parcialmente. Este 
documento aprovecha estos períodos limitados de vigor para analizar empíricamente los 
impactos de las tasas en la congestión judicial. Para poder hacerlo, se ha recopilado una 
base de datos trimestral con información sobre la carga de trabajo real de la jurisdicción 
civil. El análisis permite concluir que los efectos de las tasas, a pesar de haber reducido la 
congestión judicial, están lejos de ser homogéneos y dependen del tipo de procedimiento, 
la carga de trabajo de los órganos judiciales y las condiciones macroeconómicas locales.
Palabras clave: tasas judiciales, efi cacia judicial, tasas de litigación.
Códigos JEL: K41, E51, G2.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays almost all European countries charge a fee for the use of the judicial
system. According to the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
(CEPEJ, 2016) in 2014 there were court fees, with different legal configurations
and tax burdens, in all countries participating in the process of evaluation of
the Commission (45) except for Luxembourg and France1. Moreover, fees have
increased in many jurisdictions over time (Hodges et al., 2010). Governments
usually justify the adoption of court fees as a means to reduce the ”congestion”
of the national judicial system, thus taking the fees as a policy of ”deterrence”
of the dispute, as an instrument of provision of funding for the administration
of justice and a way to enhance the access to justice (by protecting low-income
litigants) (Rickman and Tzavara, 2005).
In this context, the relevance of the good performance of enforcement in-
stitutions (such as the judicial system) for explaining differences in economic
efficiency is out of question today. Following Coase (1960) carrying on market
transactions involves both contracting and controlling that the terms of the con-
tracts are being respected. If enforcing contracts becomes very difficult, agents
may decide not to sign certain agreements. For instance, this risk seems critical
in the case of investment decisions [Nunn (2007), Mora-Sanguinetti and Spruk
(2018)]. North (1994) considered ”enforcement” as part of the ”institutions” i.e.
constraints that structure human interactions. The main enforcement mecha-
nism in any develop economy is the judicial system as all the rest of mechanisms2
depend on it in ultimate terms. In summary, a well-functioning judicial system,
is critical for economic performance. Several economic studies (see Palumbo et
al. 2013a for a survey) have found effects ranging from the impacts on the credit
markets [Jappelli et al. (2005) or Shvets (2013) among many others], firm size
(Giacomelli and Menon, 2017) or specialization (Chemin, 2012).
However, the use of court fees as a tool for achieving higher economic effi-
ciency is not clear. If we focus on the impact of court fees on litigation, the lit-
erature remarks that neither extreme is beneficial: low (or inexistent) court fees
may lead to high levels of litigation, which may lead to a judicial collapse and a
subsequent reduction in the effective exercise of the right of citizens to access the
judicial system (Shavell, 1997, Esteller-More´, 2002, Esposito et al, 2014 or Mery
Nieto, 2015). From this point of view, court fees would be ”internalizing” part of
the social costs generated by the litigants (thus, reducing a negative externality
of litigation). However, high court fees may prevent some ”meritorious” cases
to be presented at the courts and therefore prevent the publication of useful ju-
1In France a court fee applies in the case of an appeal procedure.
2We could allude to several ”enforcement” mechanisms available in an economy: on the
private side, we could mention arbitration, ”reputation”, ”prestige” (North, 1990) or even
looking like a ”gentleman” (Mokyr, 2010). On the public side, there are also several mech-
anisms (apart from the judicial system) like the notaries, the sanction functions of some
regulators or public agencies, etc.
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risprudence (which is needed to generate legal certainty). Thus, high court fees
may reduce some positive externalities of litigation (Maher, 2010). Dome´nech
(2017) illustrates this set of problems taking as an example the conflicts related
to the protection of the environment in the contentious-administrative jurisdic-
tion. He argues that it is possible to think that there is infralitigation in those
cases. On the one hand, pollution may affect future generations that do not
even litigate today. On the other, the private benefit for a litigant may be less
than the cost of litigation. For all these reasons, it does not make sense to
discourage even more the arrival of these cases in court. This study focuses on
the analysis of the impact of judicial fees on litigation, thus reducing a potential
”negative externality”.
3The litigation rate is measured as the ratio of the number of new conflicts of civil nature
brought to the courts in a given year in relation to the population. When the GDP is used,
it is measured in PPP-purchasing power parity- in US dollars.
4Spain had no fees between 1986 (when the system of 1959 was abrogated) and 2002.
5For an extensive analysis of the case law on court fees, see Dome´nech (2017).
6Sentence of the Constitutional Court 140/2016 of 21 of July.
g y
Spain seems to be an interesting economy to empirically study if court fees
have clear impacts on judicial efficacy through their impact on litigation. On
the one hand, Spain has one of the highest rates of litigation at the international
level. Specifically, it would have the third highest litigation rate of the OECD
(after Russia and the Czech Republic) if measured in per capita terms or the
fourth highest if measured with respect to the GDP3 (Palumbo et al. 2013a
and 2013b). These results are represented in Figure 1. Litigation rates have
been found to have a direct (and negative) impact on the efficacy of the judicial
system. Not surprisingly, the trial length of a first instance dispute in Spain
is 272 days, higher than the OECD’s average (238 days). These results are in
line with those published by the CEPEJ (2016), suggesting that Spanish courts
would need 318 days to resolve a conflict, compared to an average of 237 days of
the CEPEJ countries. If we follow the World Bank Doing Business indicators,
Spanish courts would need 510 days to resolve a commercial dispute (compared
to 499 days in Germany and 395 in France). All this, in turn, has several nega-
tive impacts on economic performance in the specific case of Spain, ranging from
reduced entrepreneurship and firm size (Garc´ıa-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti,
2014 and 2015) to distorted credit markets (Mora-Sanguinetti et al. 2017).
On the other hand, despite the high rates of litigation, Spain has traditionally
lacked a system of court fees. The adoption of the fees in 2002 was significantly
later than in other countries.4 In that first moment, court fees were paid by
legal entities and enterprises. Later, in 2012, the payment was extended to
individuals. This generated a strong opposition by the legal profession and it
was appealed several times before the tribunals5 (see Section 2). Thus, the
”new” fees survived in their original configuration only for a short time while
they were abrogated in 2015 for individuals (since then, they were only enforced
for legal entities and businesses). Later, in 2016,6 the Constitutional Court of
Spain considered the be unconstitutional a major part of the regulation of 2012.
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This article takes advantage of the bounded periods of enforcement of the
fees (in their different configurations) and analyses empirically their impacts on
the litigation rates (by type of civil procedure) and the congestion of the judi-
cial system of Spain. In other words, we analyse whether the fees affected the
”demand” for justice, as measured by the per capita litigation, and a measure
of equilibrium in the functioning of the judicial system that takes into account
both ”demand” (entry of new cases) and ”supply” factors (cases resolved). This
is done for the civil jurisdiction. To do this, we collected a novel database of the
workload of Spanish civil courts at the local level (50 provinces) by quarters,
between 2001 and 2015. In summary, this article concludes that the different
systems of court fees had some effects reducing both the litigation rates and the
congestion of the courts. However, those results are far from homogenous. The
congestion of the judicial system got significantly reduced only in a limited set
of procedures. The effects also depended on the fees considered (2002 or 2012).
In addition, we must highlight that the effect of the fees were not homoge-
nous among the Spanish provinces although the design of the judicial system
is common to all of them. More specifically, the sectoral composition of the
local economy or the local unemployment rate may play a role. This stresses
that, overall, the impacts of court fees depended not only on the judicial struc-
ture but also on the type of procedure mostly used in the province and the
macroeconomic conditions surrounding the courts. Therefore, this analysis has
immediate policy implications.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: section 2 analyses the adoption
of the two systems of court fees in Spain (2002 and 2012) and its evolution in
the long term, paying particular attention to its partial abrogation (which took
place, for individuals, in 2015). Section 3 provides the details on how we have
built the database and the judicial indicators used in the econometric exercise.
Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and the controls included in the es-
timations. Section 5 shows the results of the models and discusses the main
findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Court fees in the long term (1986-2015) in
Spain
Since the abrogation of the court fees system of 19597, there has been two re-
cent schemes of court fees in Spain: the fees of the Law 53/20028 (”old” fee
system) affecting the civil and the administrative jurisdictions and the ”new”
court fees adopted with the Law 10/20129 (extended to the labour jurisdiction).
7Law 25/1986 of 24 of December, de supresio´n de las tasas judiciales.
8Law 53/2002, of 30 of December, de Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas y del Orden Social.
9Law 10/2012 of 20 of November, por la que se regulan determinadas tasas en el a´mbito
de la Administracio´n de Justicia y del Instituto Nacional de Toxicolog´ıa y Ciencias Forenses.
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As a clarification, the Spanish judicial system is composed of four jurisdic-
tions: civil, criminal, labor and the jurisdiction for suits under administrative
Law (see Figure 2). The judges and magistrates of each jurisdiction have a
certain degree of specialization and each jurisdiction is regulated by specific
procedural regulations. Thus, for example, the ”Civil Procedural Law” (which
regulates the functioning of the civil jurisdiction) is different from the ”Criminal
Procedural Law” (which regulates the functioning of the criminal jurisdiction).
The nature of the conflict will direct its resolution towards one or another juris-
diction. Thus, the civil jurisdiction resolves conflicts of private nature (between
private companies, legal entities and individuals), the criminal jurisdiction re-
solves cases related to criminal behavior, the administrative jurisdiction resolves
disputes related to the public administration and, finally, the labor jurisdiction
deals with conflicts related with employment decisions (such as dismissals within
a private company). Once inside a jurisdiction, the case will take the form of
a specific procedure. In the Civil jurisdiction, the type of procedure depends
partially on the subject and the amount. There are four types of procedure:
the ordinary judgment, the verbal judgment, the payment procedure and the
exchange and cheques procedure. For instance, an ”ordinary judgment” is gen-
erally used if a case involves a sum of at least 6000 euros (see Section 3).
Figure 3 provides an outline of the court fees enforced in Spain through time
and jurisdiction. The ”old” court fees were in force between 1st January 2003
and 21 November 2012. The payer of these fees were only the legal entities and
enterprises in the civil and the administrative jurisdictions. Fees were made up
of a fixed part (which depended on the type of procedure) and a variable part,
consisting of 0.5% of the amount involved (if the amount was below 1 million
euros) and 0.25% if the amount was over 1 million. This variable part of the fee
had a maximum of 6000 euros.
The ”new” fee system entered into force on 22 November 2012, abrogated
the ”old” scheme and extended the payment to individuals, keeping them also
for legal entities and enterprises. The ”new” fees were payable in the social
jurisdiction for the first time (as well as in the civil and administrative juris-
dictions). As in the previous system, the fees were composed by a fixed part,
by type of procedure and a variable part (with a maximum of 10000 euros)
consisting of 0.5% of the amount involved up to 1 million euros and 0.25% if
the amount was over 1 million. A consideration that can be made is that the
ratio ”fee / amount of the lawsuit” is higher in small claims (such as in the ver-
bal procedure) compared to larger claims (as those resolved using the ordinary
procedure).
)
As it was already discussed, court fees generated much controversy in the
media in Spain. On the side of the legal profession, the media pressure against
the fees was high, both at the level of individual lawyers and at the level of the
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Bar Associations10. As Shavell (1997) highlights, the bar has interests against
the policies which curtail demand for legal services. On the side of the judicial
system, there were also judges opposed to the fees, but they had no margin to
avoid charging them or to generate a boycott. Among the reasons why they had
little room to intervene, we could cite the following: the laws passing the fees
did not explicitly provide for postponement or fractionation of the payment of
the fees and they did not allow to choose not collecting them in specific circum-
stances (they were, therefore, ”automated”). We could mention a paper critical
to the fees coming from the judicial side (Chaves Garc´ıa, 2013) although there
were also voices in favour (Viguer Soler, 2010). In reaction to the fees of 2012,
there were at least four cuestiones de inconstitucionalidad and five recursos de
inconstitucionalidad before the Constitutional Court (see Dome´nech, 2017).
In a short time (around 3 months), the government decided to amend the
”new” system through the Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 3/201311 (which entered
into force on February 24, 2013). This reform reduced the variable part for
individuals to 0.1% of the amount involved and established its maximum in
2000 euros. Finally, the RDL 1/201512 (which entered into force on 1 February
2015) abrogated the court fees for individuals (”abrogation” in Figure 3). Later,
as it was mentioned, the Constitutional Court declared that a large part of the
regulation of 2012 was unconstitutional.
10As an example, the Madrid Bar Association supported a signature campaign
through change.org (www.change.org/stoptasas). The campaign collected more than
200.000 signatures against the fees. The Bar Association of Barcelona conducted
a campaign entitled ”Stop taxes” available at https://www.icab.cat/files/230-9281-
IMAGEN/UnAnyDeDolUnAnydeTaxes-Campanya.jpg .
11RDL 3/2013, of 22 of February, por el que se modifica el re´gimen de las tasas en el a´mbito
de la Administracio´n de Justicia y el sistema de asistencia jur´ıdica gratuita.
12RDL 1/2015, of 27 of February, de mecanismo de segunda oportunidad, reduccio´n de carga
financiera y otras medidas de orden social.
13This Law abrogated the ”old” CPL of 1881.
This article investigates the impacts of court fees (both the ”old” and the
”new” systems) on the litigation rates and the efficacy of the courts of the civil
jurisdiction. This article explores as well the preliminary effects of the abroga-
tion which took place in 2015. The analysis of the effects in the administrative
jurisdiction were covered in Mart´ınez-Matute and Mora-Sanguinetti (2017).
It seems relevant for the analysis to note that the adoption of both the ”old”
and the ”new” fees in Spain took place in a period of institutional stability as
they did not coincide with other major legislative initiatives in the civil proce-
dural regulations. In fact, the most important change in those regulations took
place in 2000 with the new Civil Procedural Law (CPL) (Law 1/2000) which
entered into force on January 8, 200113 (therefore, before the entry into force of
the ”old” fees analysed here). Moreover, none of the systems affected the rules
about who should bear the payment of the fees: in all of their configurations,
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be the winner of the conflict.14
3 Measuring litigation -and efficacy- rates in the
Spanish civil jurisdiction
We have compiled data from the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) at
the court level, by type of procedure and on a quarterly basis (from the first
quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2015). The database of the CGPJ pro-
vides statistical information on the real workloads of the courts and tribunals.
In this paper we analyze specifically the impact of court fees in the perfor-
mance (and litigation rates) of the civil jurisdiction. There are several reasons
why the analysis should be focused in this jurisdiction: it is the only jurisdiction
for which there have been court fees throughout the whole period 2002-2015 and,
as noted above, has not been affected by substantial changes in its procedural
regulations or its fee-shifting rules (as happened to the administrative juris-
diction) (see Mart´ınez-Matute and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2017). In more general
terms, both the substantive and procedural regulations of the Civil jurisdiction
are supplementary to those of other jurisdictions making this analysis useful for
them.
A relevant issue for our analysis is the set of procedural rules which deter-
mine the relevant (competent) court. In summary, two companies that litigate
in Spain cannot normally choose the province in which to file a claim15 (see
Garc´ıa-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014 and 2015). Performing the analysis
at the province level allows us to exploit information on some macroeconomic
variables that seem relevant for controlling the experiment.
We will analyze the impact of the fees on the conflicts taking the form of
a standard civil procedure (ordinary, verbal, payment or exchange). Figure 2
provides a simplified scheme of the Spanish Civil jurisdiction. The procedures
analyzed in this paper are shown in grey. Conflicts in the Spanish civil jurisdic-
tion are resolved, in first instance, by the first instance courts16. The specific
type of procedure depends, in general terms, on the amount involved.17 Ordi-
nary judgments are used if the conflict involves a sum of at least 6000 euros.
Verbal judgments take place when the amount is less than 6000 euros. Fur-
thermore, some specific disputes are resolved through ”simpler” and ”faster”
14Shavell (1982) argues that the composition of cases arriving to the tribunals may be
different under different configurations of the ”fee shifting rules”.
15Articles 50 and 51 of the Civil Procedure Law limit the possibility of choosing the court
in practice.
16Or ”first instance and instruction” courts in small towns.
17Some exceptions apply: an ordinary judgment will be also used in certain cases (indepen-
dently of the amount involved) such as in the appeal against decisions of the governing bodies
of a company.
the one who initiated the procedure paid the fee regardless if he turned out to
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exchange and payment (monitorio) procedures. An exchange procedure will
be used in the case of a conflict related to a bounced check, for instance. A
payment procedure will be used if the plaintiff claims to have an unpaid invoice
which can be presented before a judge.
The complexity and formalism of the procedures, as regulated in the Civil
Procedural Law, increase with the amount involved (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010),
therefore the ”ordinary” procedure is the most ”formal” and ”complex”. That
procedure is also focused on solving some specific enterprise conflicts. In con-
trast, the ”payment” procedure is simpler: the plaintiff may act before a tribunal
without the representation of a lawyer. Even though there is no quantitative
information available about what type of entity (natural or legal persons) initi-
ates each procedure, we have information on the total use of each procedure by
quarter and province.
Figure 4 graphs the entry of new cases in the civil jurisdiction by type of
procedure. There seems to be an increase in those numbers even after the adop-
tion of the various systems of court fees. This may have to do with, on the
one hand, the increase in the GDP (and the complexity of the Spanish econ-
omy in the long run) and, on the other hand, with the increase in workloads
brought by the crisis environment in the last years. These observations seem
to be consistent with previous findings by the literature. Following Palumbo
et al. (2013a), the number of cases brought to the court system of a country
is a function, among others, of the frequency of disputes in a society, which is
influenced by the volume and complexity of economic transactions. In addition,
the crisis (since 2008) may have increased litigation because during a recession
there may be more breaches of contracts18. There may be also other factors
which may affect the rate of litigation, such as the incentives affecting the mar-
ket for lawyering or the complexity of the local economy (Mora-Sanguinetti and
Garoupa, 2015). All this justifies the need to construct an econometric model
taking into account all these factors.
First, we will estimate the impacts of court fees in the litigation rate per
capita and by type of procedure. The litigation rate is obtained as the quotient
of new cases (taking the form of a specific type of procedure, ”p”) brought to
the courts divided by the population. The subscript ”j” denotes the province
(we merge all the new cases of all the courts of the same province), and ”t” the
quarter. With this measure we are estimating the impact of court fees on the
”demand” for litigation.19
18Although this is what is observed in the Spanish case, the interaction between litigation
and the economic cycle is still being discussed in the literature. Under some assumptions,
Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) argue that litigation should increase in economic booming in-
stead. Mora-Sanguinetti et al. (2017) analyze the effects of judicial performance on the credit
market, and suggest that those effects, which show differences among the different phases of
the economic cycle, may partially depend on the specific judicial procedure analyzed. In our
sample, beginning in 2001, we cover several years of expansion and recession.
19On the right side of the equation we will include lawyers per capita as a control variable
(see section 4).





Then, we will estimate the impact of court fees on a classic measure of ”ef-
ficacy” of the judicial system: the ”congestion” rate, which we computed for
each type of procedure [see, among others, Garc´ıa-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti
(2015)].
Congestion ratej,p,t =
Pending casesj,p,t−1 +New casesj,p,t
Cases resolvedj,p,t
(2)
The congestion rate is defined as the ratio of the sum of pending cases (mea-
sured at the beginning of the quarter), plus the new cases measured in a specific
quarter divided by the resolved cases in the same quarter. A lower congestion
rate is related to a greater efficacy of the courts of the province and could be
used as a ”proxy” of the trial length. This measure could be considered, there-
fore, an ”equilibrium” measure that takes into account both ”demand” factors
(”new cases”) and ”supply” factors (”cases resolved”). Figure 5 shows the av-
erage annual congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction by procedure.
4 Identification strategy
4.1 Capturing the effects of the adoption of court fees in
the civil jurisdiction
We have built three dummy variables which capture the entry into force of the
”old” court fees, the ”new” court fees and the ”abrogation” of the ”new” fees
for individuals. In order to avoid the risk of capturing the impacts of various
systems at a time in each model, we restrict our period of analysis in each model
to a window which contains only the time period before and after the date of
entry into force of the previous or the next reform.
Thus, to capture the effect of the introduction of the first (”old”) court fees’
system we included a dummy variable that takes value 1 during the period in
which that system was enforced in Spain (from 1st January 2003). Our period
of analysis in this case is a window which contains years 2001 to 2012.
Reform 52/2002t =
{
0 if t < 2003T1
1 if t ≥ 2003T1
}
(3)
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For the analysis of the effects of the adoption of the ”new” court fees in
2012, we analyzed the observations contained in the ”window” between 2003
and 2015. The dummy variable takes the following values:
Reform 10/2012t =
{
0 if t < 2013T1
1 if t ≥ 2013T1
}
(4)
Finally, in order to analyze the effects of the ”abrogation” of the ”new” fees
for individuals, we analyzed a window which contains the period 2003-2015. In
this case, we included a dummy which takes the following values:
Reform 1/2015t =
{
0 if t < 2015T1




As it was discussed in section 3, the volume of litigation and the rate of conges-
tion of the courts may be the result of multiple factors not directly related to the
adoption of court fees. Thus, first, we included controls for the macroeconomic
environment of each province in each quarter: the income per capita (whereas
the higher the income, the higher the litigation) and the sectoral composition
of the economy of the province i.e. the weight of manufacturing, construction,
agriculture and services (whereas sectoral composition may affect litigation).20
Secondly, we included the default rate (measured as the NPL ratio). The
NPL ratio is the proportion of non-performing loans claims on the total available
credit. To construct this variable, we obtained data from the Central Credit
Register of the Banco de Espan˜a (CIR), which contains information on all21
Spanish loans to non-financial companies granted by credit institutions operat-
ing in Spain above a reporting threshold of 6000 euros. As loans to businesses
are often higher than the threshold for registration, CIR provides in practice the
entire population of loans to companies in Spain. We refer as ”non-performing
loan” a loan that is in default or close to being in default. The regulation of
the Banco de Espan˜a states that a loan is in this situation if the payment of
principal or interest has been delayed for more than 90 days or there are cir-
cumstances that makes the full repayment of the loan unlikely.
In addition to those ”macroeconomic” controls, we included in the models
the number of companies, in per capita terms, to account for the ”social com-
20Palumbo et al. 2013a, find evidence that points to lower litigation in the industrial sector.
21We are including any instrument through which banks can provide credit to businesses:
financial loans, commercial loans, letters of credit, leasing, factoring, repos, securities lending
and loans or credits transferred to third parties.
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plexity” which can influence the rate of local litigation (Carmignani and Gia-
comelli, 2010, Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa, 2015), and finally we controlled
by the presence of lawyers per capita in the province considered. There is ev-
idence to suggest that lawyers and litigation rate may be correlated (although
the relationship is not necessarily endogenous)22. To illustrate this issue, Fig-
ure 6 shows the very different size (on average) of the markets for lawyers at
the provincial level in Spain. As a robustness check, we interacted the number
of lawyers with the reforms in order to test if there are any differential effects
because of the distinct enforcement environments at the local level. Results are
shown in the Appendix (Table A.3.).
4.3 Identification model
We set up a regression model which relates our measures of litigation or judicial
efficacy (the rate of court congestion) with one of the dummy variables specified
in Section 4.1, the set of controls specified in Section 4.2 and provincial ”fixed
effects”, which capture the characteristics of the Spanish provinces which do not
vary over time or do so very slowly.
We also add a group of quarterly variables (Q2, Q3 and Q4) as a seasonal
adjustment, as the entry rates of new conflicts are affected by a seasonal pat-
tern related to the court’s work calendar. Thus, with these variables we aim
to have seasonally adjusted series of litigation. Q2, Q3 and Q4, take the value
1 if quarter t is a second, third or fourth quarter within a specific year and 0
otherwise.
Our estimates are obtained fitting the following econometric model:
( ) g
22In addition to the above references, see Hanssen (1999) or Buonanno and Galizzi (2012).
Litigationjpt is the rate of litigation for each civil procedure p (ordinary,
verbal, payment, or exchange procedures), αj are the provincial fixed effects,
Controlkjt is a matrix which includes the controls explained in section 4.2 and
jpt is the error term of the model.
The model will be estimated including the whole set of 50 Spanish provinces,
but we also estimated the model excluding Madrid and Barcelona in order to
have quasi-experiments. Results in this specific case are shown in the Appendix
(Table A.2). Madrid and Barcelona host the headquarters of the largest law
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firms (Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa, 2015) of Spain and the main banks. Due
to the high litigation generated by the banking system activity during the cri-
sis, we explored if the results were affected by the litigation rates of these two
provinces.
In all the regressions, errors are clustered at the province level to be ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation [Angrist and Pischke, (2009),
Wooldridge, (2010)]. The inclusion of fixed effects by province and our set of
dummy variables per quarter help to partially mitigate the omitted variable bias.
As a robustness check, we have also estimated the model with the inclusion
of the reforms using one quarter lag and one quarter lead alternatively. Reforms
are generally announced in advance. Therefore litigation may be reactive even
before the introduction of the fee. We should note that no significant results
were found when we included one quarter lag or lead to each of the reforms23.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Impacts of the ”old” court fees (Law 52/2002)
Table 1 shows the results of the models which estimate the effects of the ”old”
system of court fees (Law 52/2002). The adoption of the ”old” court fees implied
a significant reduction in per capita litigation in the case of verbal and exchange
procedures. Furthermore, the ”old” system was significantly associated with an
increase in the litigation taking the form of payment procedures (monitorios).
Conceivably, litigation taking the form of a payment procedure may react differ-
ently when confronted to an increase in the costs to access the judicial system.
There are several reasons for that: firstly, the ”monitorios” were new proce-
dures (born with the new CPL of 2000) with some attractive features. They
were simpler and faster to resolve (as it was mentioned in Section 3). As ”new”
procedures, they absorbed an important part of the new conflicts arriving to the
courts (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010). Also, as they were ”simpler” and potentially
faster than the rest of old procedures, they were ”cheaper”. Therefore, they
may absorb litigation when the ”price” to use the judicial system increases. In
summary, we may be observing a ”safe haven” effect by which the new payment
procedures concentrate higher demand as a result of the increase in the ”price”
to litigate.
Finally, the ”old” court fees do not seem to have a significant effect in re-
ducing judicial congestion rates except for the case of the ordinary procedures
(which got reduced by a 3%).
23A table with results is not included in this version of the paper, but it is available upon
request
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If we focus solely on the analysis of the provinces which are most congested
in only one of the procedures (32 provinces out of 50) (see Table 2), we observed
that the effects found above disappear. This shows that the effects of the old
rates are concentrated in the provinces without serious problems of judicial con-
gestion.
As an overall assessment, the previous paragraphs explain that the effect
of the fees, far from being homogenous, depend on the type of procedure and
the workload of the courts. This analysis should be completed highlighting that
the effects are also dependent on the macroeconomic conditions surrounding the
local courts, such as the sectoral composition of the economy.
5.2 Impacts of the ”new” court fees (Law 10/2012)
Results are shown in Table 3. The adoption of the ”new” fees seems to be
related to a significant reduction in the litigation taking the form of exchange
and payment procedures. In contrast, the ”new” fees were positively related to
the litigation rates in the form of ordinary procedures. As it was discussed, the
”new” fees forced individuals to pay for the first time. Thus, we should expect
to observe higher effects precisely in the most used procedures by individuals:
the procedures involving lower amounts, which are all with the exception of the
ordinary procedures.
Finally, these fees significantly reduced the congestion of the judicial system
when solving verbal, exchange and payment procedures. There is another effect
in the same direction: As the fees were composed by a fixed part and a variable
part, it is reasonable to assume that the ratio between the fees and the amount of
the claim is higher in those cases with a lower amounf of the claim (for instance,
in the verbal cases). Thus, probably, in those cases the deterrent efficacy of the
reform might be more significant.
24Unfortunately, there is no specific statistical information on the composition of cases which
arrive to the courts, so we cannot control for that composition in the econometric analysis.
If we restrict the sample to the most congested provinces in one of proce-
dures (33 out of 50) the previous results get heightened (see Table 4). We can
provide two explanations for this effect: on the one hand, the congestion is a
cost for the litigants (as we can expect that a conflict will take more time to be
solved in a congested court). Therefore, in the most congested provinces, the
direct cost of congestion was joined by the cost implied by the adoption of the
fees after they were adopted. On the other hand, we should think about the
”quality” or ”merit” (composition) of the conflicts arriving to the court system
in each province: it is conceivable that in the most congested provinces there is
a larger presence of ”non-meritorious” cases which may be more affected by the
fees.24
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1846
5.3 The effect of the abrogation of the court fees to indi-
viduals
Table 5 shows the results of the models which analyze the abrogation of the
court fees made by the RDLaw 1/201525. As it could be expected, the effect of
the Reform 1/2015 softens the effect of the previous changes in the legislation
on litigation and on the congestion rate. The congestion rate and the litigation
taking the form of verbal and exchange procedures increase after the abrogation
of the fees for individuals.
5.4 A note on the years 2016 and 2017
The judgment of the Constitutional Court 140/2016 declared unconstitutional
the variable part of the court fees in force in the civil jurisdiction. The afore-
mentioned ruling was published in the BOE (Official Gazette of the State) of
August 15, 2016, having general effects since then. It seems appropriate to ana-
lyze if the publication of the judgment had effects on the rates of litigation and
congestion. At the national level there appear to be no substantial changes in
congestion rates for 2016 and 2017 (although it should be noted that congestion
increased slightly in 2016 and decreased slightly again in 2017). Neither do
there seem to be relevant changes between the different types of procedure. It
should be clarified that a period of two years is too small to observe important
trend changes.
6 Conclusions
This article analyzes empirically the effects of the adoption of court fees, which
are a common means of judicial management in Europe. More specifically, this
research studies the impacts of the fees on litigation in Spain. The Spanish econ-
omy shows very high litigation rates compared to the rest of OECD countries.
Moreover, the fee systems are recent and are limited in time, which facilitates
their empirical analysis. Consequently, in this paper we fit several econometric
models which exploit variations observed across time and provinces in Spanish
real judicial data (both litigation and congestion rates are considered). With
reference to prior literature, we also take into account several macroeconomic
variables which may affect the litigation rates at the local level.
The paper examines both the system of court fees passed in 2002 (which en-
forced legal entities and enterprises) and the fee system of 2012, which extended
the fees to individuals. This second system was fully in force for a short period
of time as it was abrogated in 2015 for individuals.
25No effects were found when analyzing the partial reform introduced by RDL 3/2013.
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This research leads to the general conclusion that the fees, although reduced
both litigation and judicial congestion rates, did not have homogeneous impacts
and did not always coincide with the desires of the legislator. According to the
results, the effects of the fees are dependent on the type of procedure (and thus,
of the user of the judicial system) and were affected by the macroeconomic en-
vironment of the courts. This research also allows to interpret some indirect
effects: the simpler or cheaper procedures (such as the ”proceso monitorio”)
may be transformed into ”safe havens” of litigation as a reaction against the
increased costs of litigation.
More specifically, each type of judicial procedure, which is different in terms
of complexity, seems to react differently to increased barriers to litigation. The
adoption of the system of 2002 reduced litigation under the form of verbal or
exchange judgments but increased litigation in the case of the ”payment pro-
cedure” (considered ”simpler” and ”faster”). The extension of the fees in 2012
appears to be related to a reduction in the litigation in the form of exchange
judgments and payment procedures but had reverse effects on the ordinary pro-
cedures (which were affected directly by the system of 2012). The latter effects
get heightened in the most congested provinces. Finally, as it was expected, the
abrogation of the courts fees for individuals in 2015 increased again the conges-
tion in the civil jurisdiction, partially neutralizing the impact of the previous
reforms.
As has been highlighted, this article focuses on the analysis of the impact of
court fees on litigation. Therefore, it emphasizes their effectiveness in reducing
a negative externality. Future research should analyze the impact of the fees in
terms of generating a potential barrier to the arrival of ”meritorious cases” to
the judicial system (reducing jurisprudence and therefore implying a negative
effect on the judicial system).
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7 Appendix
Table A.1 contains some descriptive statistics of the variables included in the
regression models.
As for the robustness checks, we have first run the models explained in sec-
tions 4 and 5 when we exclude the observations of Madrid and Barcelona (see
Table A.2). As it can be observed, the results are consistent with those found
in section 5.
In order to further explore the potential differential effects implied by ”strong”
(in the sense of higher number of lawyers per capita) and ”weak” lawyering mar-
kets in Spain (see Figure 6), we have interacted the number of lawyers per capita
(lawyers pc) with the reforms in the model below. The results, shown in Table
A.3, are again consistent with those found in section 5.






jt + φ1Q2t + φ2Q3t + φ3Q4t + jpt
The interaction between the reform and the number of lawyers per capita
smooths the effect of the reform on the congestion of ordinary cases. This fact
implies that almost the entire effect of the reform was generated by the variabil-
ity in the number of lawyers. Before 2002, an increase in the number of lawyers
affected positively the congestion in ordinary cases. As a consequence of the
reform, the congestion got reduced because the impact of the number of lawyers
in the dependent variable turns negative. The ”safe haven” effect explained in
section 5.1 could explain this observation.
Table A.4. includes the estimation of the congestion rate for the total num-
ber of cases (verbal, payment, ordinary and exchange). Results seem to confirm
what was previously mentioned: in general terms, the reform of 2012 has a sig-
nificant average impact reducing the congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1846
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1846
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1846
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1801  OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The impact of high school financial education on 
financial knowledge and choices: evidence from a randomized trial in Spain.
1802  IGNACIO HERNANDO, IRENE PABLOS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA and JAVIER VALLÉS: Private Saving. New Cross-
Country Evidence Based on Bayesian Techniques.
1803  PABLO AGUILAR and JESÚS VÁZQUEZ: Term structure and real-time learning.
1804  MORITZ A. ROTH: International co-movements in recessions.
1805  ANGELA ABBATE and DOMINIK THALER: Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel.
1806  PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: Money in Spain. New historical statistics. 1830-1998.
1807  GUILHERME BANDEIRA: Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk.
1808  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ: Credit constraints, fi rm investment and growth: evidence from survey data.
1809  LAURA ALFARO, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: On the direct and indirect real 
effects of credit supply shocks.
1810  ROBERTO RAMOS and CARLOS SANZ: Backing the incumbent in diffi cult times: the electoral impact of wildfi res.
1811  GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and RAQUEL VEGAS: Bank lending standards over the cycle: 
the role of fi rms’ productivity and credit risk.
1812  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and ROK SPRUK: Industry vs services: do enforcement institutions matter for 
specialization patterns? Disaggregated evidence from Spain.
1813  JAMES CLOYNE, CLODOMIRO FERREIRA and PAOLO SURICO: Monetary policy when households have debt: new 
evidence on the transmission mechanism.
1814  DMITRI KIRPICHEV and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: The costs of trade protectionism: evidence from Spanish fi rms 
and non-tariff measures.
1815  ISABEL ARGIMÓN, CLEMENS BONNER, RICARDO CORREA, PATTY DUIJM, JON FROST, JAKOB DE HAAN, 
LEO DE HAAN and VIKTORS STEBUNOVS: Financial institutions’ business models and the global transmission of 
monetary policy.
1816  JOSE ASTURIAS, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ROBERTO RAMOS: Competition and the welfare gains from 
transportation infrastructure: evidence from the Golden Quadrilateral of India.
1817  SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE: Multidimensional media slant: complementarities in news reporting by US newspapers .
1818  PILAR CUADRADO, AITOR LACUESTA, MARÍA DE LOS LLANOS MATEA and F. JAVIER PALENCIA-GONZÁLEZ: 
Price strategies of independent and branded dealers in retail gas market. The case of a contract reform in Spain.
1819  ALBERTO FUERTES, RICARDO GIMENO and JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Extraction of infl ation expectations from 
fi nancial instruments in Latin America.
1820  MARIO ALLOZA, PABLO BURRIEL and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Fiscal policies in the euro area: revisiting the size of spillovers.
1821  MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and ALBERTO URTASUN: Uncertainty, fi rm heterogeneity and labour adjustments. 
Evidence from European countries.
1822  GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI, GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS and ENRIQUE SENTANA: The rise and fall 
of the natural interest rate.
1823  ALBERTO MARTÍN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and TOM SCHMITZ: The fi nancial transmission of housing bubbles: 
evidence from Spain.
1824  DOMINIK THALER: Sovereign default, domestic banks and exclusion from international capital markets.
1825  JORGE E. GALÁN and JAVIER MENCÍA: Empirical assessment of alternative structural methods for identifying cyclical 
systemic risk in Europe.
1826  ROBERTO BLANCO and NOELIA JIMÉNEZ: Credit allocation along the business cycle: evidence from the latest boom 
bust credit cycle in Spain.
1827  ISABEL ARGIMÓN: The relevance of currency-denomination for the cross-border effects of monetary policy.
1828 SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE: The effects of tax changes on economic activity: a narrative approach to frequent anticipations.
1829 MATÍAS CABRERA, GERALD P. DWYER and MARÍA J. NIETO: The G-20 regulatory agenda and bank risk.
1830 JACOPO TIMINI and MARINA CONESA: Chinese exports and non-tariff measures: testing for heterogeneous effects at the
 product level.
1831  JAVIER ANDRÉS, JOSÉ E. BOSCÁ, JAVIER FERRI and CRISTINA FUENTES-ALBERO: Households’ balance sheets and
the effect of fi scal policy.
1832  ÓSCAR ARCE, MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA, SERGIO MAYORDOMO and STEVEN ONGENA: Adapting lending policies 
when negative interest rates hit banks’ profi ts.
1833  VICENTE SALAS, LUCIO SAN JUAN and JAVIER VALLÉS: Corporate cost and profi t shares in the euro area and the US: 
the same story?
1834  MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ-EIRAS and CARLOS SANZ: Women’s representation in politics: voter bias, party bias, and electoral 
systems.
1835  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ and BEATRIZ DE BLAS: Faraway, so close! Technology diffusion and fi rm heterogeneity in the 
medium term cycle of advanced economies.
1836  JACOPO TIMINI: The margins of trade: market entry and sector spillovers, the case of Italy (1862-1913).
1837  HENRIQUE S. BASSO and OMAR RACHEDI: The young, the old, and the government: demographics and fi scal 
multipliers.
1838  PAU ROLDÁN and SONIA GILBUKH: Firm dynamics and pricing under customer capital accumulation.
1839  GUILHERME BANDEIRA, JORDI CABALLÉ and EUGENIA VELLA: Should I stay or should I go? Austerity, 
unemployment and migration.
1840  ALESSIO MORO and OMAR RACHEDI: The changing structure of government consumption spending.
1841  GERGELY GANICS, ATSUSHI INOUE and BARBARA ROSSI: Confi dence intervals for bias and size distortion in IV
and local projections – IV models.
1842  MARÍA GIL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ, A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: Nowcasting private consumption: 
traditional indicators, uncertainty measures, credit cards and some internet data.
1843  MATÍAS LAMAS and JAVIER MENCÍA: What drives sovereign debt portfolios of banks in a crisis context?
1844  MIGUEL ALMUNIA, POL ANTRÀS, DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ and EDUARDO MORALES: Venting out: exports during 
a domestic slump.
1845  LUCA FORNARO and FEDERICA ROMEI: The paradox of global thrift.
1846  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE: An economic analysis of court fees: evidence from 
the Spanish civil jurisdiction.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
